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A NOTE ON DEVELOPMENTAL SYNTAX 
JUAN URIAGEREKA 
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND AT COLLEGE PARK 
Let me set aside some issues I will not deal 
with. First, I will have nothing to say about whether 
the methodology of the experiments discussed in this 
conference is sound. I am not a psycholinguist, others 
have already commented on this, and in any case I am 
more interested in discussing the syntactic 
consequences of the findings, assuming they are real. 
Second, I will not discuss specific works in any 
detail. I do have technical comments to mostly all of 
them, but these I believe would interest the authors 
more than a general audience; in any case our theories 
at this point are wide enough either for the 
experiments to adapt to my technicalities or, if the 
experiments are proven correct, for the syntactic 
theories to adapt to their lower-scale consequences. 
Finally, although I will admit variation in technical 
implementation of theories, I will not admit giving up 
the central hypothesis of a system of principles and 
parameters that all of us in the conference, I think, 
assume uncontroversially. It is in light of this basic 
hypothesis that I want to evaluate developmental claims 
of the sort made here. 
What does it mean for knowledge of language to 
be different from a stage I of infants' development to 
a stage k that we may call 'adult'? If our central 
hypothesis is correct, this must mean that either a 
change in the system of principles, or a change in the 
system of parameters, or both, must be allowed to 
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happen from I to k. Needless to say, there are lower-
level changes that range from the acquisition of 
vocabulary items to the mastery of language idioms and 
cliches that do not fall into the previous categories, 
at least not obviously. But as is commonly assumed, it 
is not clear that linguistics has anything interesting 
to say about the specifics of each of these cases, at 
least from the point of view of knowledge of language. 
A general theory of learning, in a strict sense now (as 
opposed to the 'learning' notion that we need, usually 
compared to growing) may be interested in these 
processes. Nevertheless, I will return in the end to 
one specific issue related to this matter. 
Let us then concentrate on the acquisition of 
general properties of language. Consider first the 
issue of principles. These come genetically specified, 
which of course does not necessarily mean they do not 
develop. In principle, there could be several reasons 
for development to take place. First, it could be that 
the linguistic system is laid out that way. I will not 
explore this here, mainly because I don't know how to. 
Second, it could be that something in the (extra 
linguistic) cognitive systems affects the sequence of 
acquisition of the linguistic one. In this instance, 
two typical situations emerge: either stimulus 
independent maturation of the relevant cognitive 
domains, or changes propitiated by triggering input of 
different sorts, which may be available to the learner 
at different stages. However, the assumption that 
input data is not organized already discards the second 
of these possibilities. Even when it appears that the 
cause for a maturational change is the data in 
question, what is at issue is not the data, but the 
nature of the mind which is not capable (at a given 
stage) of processing these data. 
In practice, we use working hypotheses of the 
sort: "access to principles is instantaneous and/or 
global, etc." I will assume that, more than just 
working hypotheses, these are the ones which make fewer 
assumptions about the language system. It seems to me 
complicated enough to design the language system for it 
to be sensitive to cognitive restrictions of the sort 
sketched above. At any rate, I will try to show that 
some of these adjustments are sound. To be precise, 
some of the papers of this conference in fact could be 
interpreted as presenting a challenge to the 
330 
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instantaneous acquisition view--for instance, those 
offering arguments that some principles, such as 
statements making reference to functional categories, 
come to be available at a time /' considerably later 
than the time / when principles making reference to 
lexical categories are available. I will try to show, 
however, that under a plausible interpretation of these 
results the instantaneous acquisition (null) hypothesis 
may be kept. I don't know whether this is good or bad; 
but I do know that the other option needs further 
justification and evidence, and it is not clear to me 
that it is necessarily invoked. 
Consider first what maturation's affecting the 
system of principles entails: (a) The developmental 
process in question must be universal; (b) the child at 
time / must not be able to do things that s/he does at 
time 1'. This may seem trivial; I don't think it is: 
(a) entails that all of the observations having to do 
with processes of this sort changing from language to 
language (Le., when the interval from / to /' is not 
constant across languages) have to be explained in 
terms of a further variable, which I will return to; 
(b) in turn entails not only that children are going to 
say different things at / and /', but also, crucially, 
that they are going to mean different things. 
Let me first explore (b). There is an old 
controversy about whether the mapping between the 
syntax and the semantics is transparent. I happen to 
believe that it is not; but even those of us that 
advocate strongly for the autonomy of syntax do want to 
have some fairly simple mapping between this and the 
semantics. If something is uncontroversial about this 
mapping it is that meaning is somehow compositional. A 
version of this within current standards is the Full 
Interpretation Principle (FIP). What FIP entails for 
LF is that everything that feeds this level is 
interpretable. We may even strengthen this to claiming 
that LF is interpreted in terms of everything that 
feeds LF (and only that). At any rate, nobody will 
deny that functional elements such as INFLECTION or 
DETERMINER have a rather precise use at LF in adult 
grammars. Here is the quandary then: if the child does 
not have these at time /, how does s/he express ideas 
that presuppose them? 
One possible answer is, of course, tIs/he 
doesn't." This has to be evaluated carefully, though, 
because functional elements are quite central to the 
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construction of many of our meaningful expressions. 
Thus, one may conceive that children do not have access 
to tense specifications or specificity restrictions; 
but that is not all we use functional elements for. 
Take any verb, and two parts within it are going to be 
clear: one, expressing a specific predicate, 
idiosyncratic to that verb; another one, expressing an 
arrangement of argument variables common to other 
verbs. The latter has been argued to be a functional 
element, as seems natural (there's a small, fixed set 
of these; they themselves do not contribute to lexical 
meaning, etc.). In fact, these days a tendency exists 
again to decompose even lexical items into more 
fundamental units, some of which (causative morphemes 
and the like) arguably fit into the functional 
paradigm. 
If the distinction lexical/functional is going 
to make any sense (and it does seem to make good 
empirical predictions), it is going to fall, most 
likely, into one of two possibilities: (i) lexical 
elements are exclusively representing matters of 
predicate logic, matters of higher order logics being 
reserved for functional elements; (ii) lexical elements 
are lexicon entries with predicative import, functional 
elements being 'the rest'. It is easy to see that 
hypothesis (a) leaves the child at time I in the case 
in point as having only predicative structure. 
Furthermore, given that virtually all words (at least 
in a large sub-set of languages) contain both lexical 
and functional sub-parts, the child would be 
learning/using lexical items which do not correspond to 
adult lexical items--in fact contain only a subset of 
the specifications of the latter. Hypothesis (b), on 
the other hand, allows the child to learn certain 
complex units, so long as these are lexicon units. It 
predicts, however, that those words which are 
syntactically decomposable into (D-structure) elements 
coming directly from the lexicon are not going to be 
learned/used if they contain a functional part. These, 
in most languages, are far from exotic.' 
1. A typical example is causative elements in Basque, Japanese, 
etc. The relevant words have the import of "cause-V", with 
essentially any verb being attached to the causative morpheme. The 
child should not be able to learn these words if the morpheme is 
functional and sjhe doesn't have access to functional elements. 
Crucially, these elements are different from non-productive forms 
which have the causality as part of their lexical meaning (e.g., 
4
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The issue of ontogenesis is crucial within the 
approach I am taking (given that I do not want to 
ascribe the developmental process directly to 
properties of the language system). Hypothesis (a) 
above leads us into the direction of a computational 
speculation. One may suggest that, for whatever 
specific reason, the relations encoded by functional 
structure are harder to construct than the relations 
encoded by lexical structure--thus the former come in 
later, together intuitively with the maturation of 
other 'pseudo-mathematical' capacities. On the other 
hand, the other plausible approach to the hypothetical 
problem is that input lexical units are more 'visible' 
than functional ones--which we know is true even in the 
adult grammar. As has been proposed in the literature, 
it is not inconceivable that the child simply does not 
identify functional elements. Assuming that this 
triggering experience is necessary for the child to 
realize that such elements exist, not hearing these 
elements would result in not being able to use them. 2 
This type of approach would be more in line with 
hypothesis (b) above, in as much as the morphological 
weight of functional elements appears to be language-
specific. Since this hypothesis entails differences in 
the lexical/functional distinction that are not 
universal, I will deal with it below when I turn to 
parametric matters. 
"worry" arguably contains a causative element as part of its 
meaning). The latter, the child should be able to learn, assuming 
these are indeed lexical elements under the hypothesis in question. 
2. Note incidentally that the latter assumption is far from 
trivial. On the one hand, we have to worry about languages where 
functional elements are not specified morphologically, hence are 
never audible. On the other, we have to worry about languages where 
functional elements enter virtually into all words, morphologically-
-the reverse instance. It does not seem to be the case that, in 
these languages, children drop those elements, like they appear to 
do in languages where the morphological presence of functional 
elements is sporadic. This difficulty is in line with the observed 
fact that, in some languages, processes of the sort of Verb-movement 
come in very early--thus, apparently Verb second appears virtually 
from scratch in German, though not in English. Assuming that 
movements of this sort presuppose the presence of functional 
categories (to serve as landing sites), this kind of evidence 
strongly suggests that the whole initial claim about functional 
elements must be framed in terms of the parameter system, and not 
the system of principles. For the sake of argument, though, I will 
proceed ignoring this sort of evidence. 
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Let us consider, then, whether a child without 
functional elements can communicate anything within 
hypothesis (a). Consider (1) below: 
(1) Sonnets are formal and meaningful 
i. Ax Sex) --> F(X) and M(x) 
ii. EE{S(x)} E = F(x) + M(x) 
(1) is ambiguous. Under reading (i), (1) means that if 
something is a sonnet, it is formal and meaningful. 
Actually, I think the statement should be weaker; in 
particular, it is not clear that it is falsified if one 
sonnet, say, is not meaningful, a general property of 
generic statements--but I'll return to this shortly. 
Under reading (ii), (1) means that there is a partition 
in the set of sonnets, E{S(x)}, whereby these are 
divided into those which are formal and those which are 
meaningful. 3 
Now, compare (1) to (2): 
(2) Successful fOrmal and meaningful sonnet writer 
In this expression I don't think that a (ii)-type 
reading is available. That "Shakespeare was a 
successful formal and meaningful sonnet writer" means 
that he wrote successfully sonnets which were both 
formal and meaningful--not that he wrote two types of 
sonnets. One of the properties of incorporation is 
that it appears to be restricted in terms of the 
functional/lexical distinction. Only functional 
elements incorporate to functional elements; only 
lexical elements incorporate to lexical elements. This 
means that whereas "sonnet", as used in (1), can be 
represented as "sonnet (x)" (not just logically, but 
also syntactically, with the variable being mapped from 
a functional element), "sonnet" as used in (2) cannot 
contain a functional part, therefore, by hypothesis, 
not a variable. In general, we do not appear to need 
variables for instances of noun incorporation; thus, we 
can call Jones "a partridge hunter" even if he has 
never hunted partridges. 4 "Partridge hunter" can be 
3. This reading is highlighted in an example like "Americans are 
black and white". 
4. The difference in question can be seen perhaps more clearly in 
(i): 
(i) a. Jones hunts partridges 
b. Jones hunts partridge 
6
University of Massachusetts Occasional Papers in Linguistics, Vol. 17 [1991], Art. 16
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol17/iss1/16
DEVELOPMENTAL SYNTAX 335 
seen as a complex predicate, where "partridge" 
specifies the type of predicate "hunter" is, but does 
not invoke actual partridges. From this point of view, 
the reason why reading (ii) is lost in (2) is that this 
reading invokes a set-theoretic operation, one which is 
not available if to begin with we do not have a way of 
constructing a set "sonnet (x)" there. 
This is not a traditional or even a standard 
view, but it has been explored in the last few years 
and I want to pursue it for the sake of argument. In 
general, elements like "sonnets" in (1) are analyzed 
set-theoretically: "the set of sonnets". But suppose 
there is a simpler way in which "sonnets"--or I should 
say, more precisely, "sonnet"--is interpretable. Think 
of an "ur" concept for the kind SONNET, which is a 
rigid designator (invariable across possible worlds).5 
One can think of names just this way: Jones may be 
represented as "Jones" (j), where i is not a variable 
but a constant index. (Literally, what Jones would 
mean is "that entity i labeled "Jones".) Let me call 
this the naming operation. (Of course, we can treat 
names set-theoretically. From this point of view, the 
The intuitive meaning of (ia) is that Jones hunts individuals 
belonging to the kind "partridges". In contrast, the intuitive 
meaning of (ib) is that Jones engages in an sub-case of the activity 
of hunting; namely, "partridge hunting". (The latter plausibly 
involves incorporation of "partridge" to "hunts", perhaps at LF- -for 
some unclear reason, English, unlike other languages, does not allow 
verbs of the [N[V]] type at S-structure.) The object in the second 
instance cannot control into a secondary resultative predicate: 
(ii) a. [Jones [[hunts partridgesi ] [PROi dead]]] 
b. *[Jones [[hunts partridgei ] [PROi dead]]] 
Assuming an analysis of the (b) instances in terms of incorporation, 
it is not clear why the trace of "partridge" cannot control PRO--
syntactically, that is. This follows, though, if partridges are not 
invoked extensionally in these instances- -not having reference, 
"partridge" cannot control PRO. 
5. Actually,"it has been argued that only natural kinds (like, 
say, "gold") are rigid designators, nominal kinds (like "bachelor") 
being amenable to a more traditional view that has elements of this 
sort be non-rigid. Presumably, "sonnet" is also a nominal kind. If 
the reader is thus unsatisfied with the argument, the example can be 
changed to "particles are weighable and measurable" (incidentally, 
a false statement at least on one interpretation), and "reliable 
weighable and measurable particle accelerator". I don't think 
there's a sense in which particle is a nominal kind--although this 
is debatable. 
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universe could be divided into those entities to which 
the predicate Jones applies (a singleton set, let us 
say), and those which do not satisfy said predicate 
(all other entities in the universe). I am assuming, 
however, that this set-theoretic distinction is not 
invoked by way of the naming operation. 6 It is not 
inconceivable that we can think of entities like 
sonnets in two ways: as members of the set of what we 
call sonnets, and as a conceptual unit labeled 
"sonnet", a kind. This would allow us to get a (i)-
type reading for example (2), even if by hypothesis no 
variable--and hence no set--is at stake. To calculate 
the meaning of the expression, we need to further name 
the simple "sonnet" (j) as "formal-and-meaningful" 
("sonnet" (j». Adjectival operations of this sort 
could be treated by allowing recursive embedding of the 
naming operation. 7 
A further consequence of the availability of 
this reading is that there should be a meaning for (1) 
where the sUbject does not denote the set of sonnets--
but rather a prototypical entity which is named 
"sonnet" (j). (In the relevant literature, kinds are 
specifically argued to be akin to names.) In that kind 
reading, there is no entailment that all sonnets must 
be formal and meaningful, which as I said seems 
correct. This is important because the relevant 
reading is generic, thus cannot be expressed in terms 
of the existential operator. Intuitively, if the 
subject were introduced by an existential, it would be 
true to say "sonnets are formal and meaningful" even if 
there is only one sonnet which is formal and 
meaningful--all the rest not being so. This does not 
seem to be an interpretation for this sentence, though. 
The point is that the relevant interpretation makes no 
reference to the existing sonnets, but simply to the 
basic concept SONNET, as mentioned also in expressions 
of the sort "the sonnet is formal and meaningful". If 
a given sonnet does not conform to this description, it 
will deviate in whatever sense from the prototypical 
concept--but will not render the statement false 
6. In fact, arguments have been provided that treating names as 
descriptions yields the wrong semantic import. I think there are 
fairly good reasons to be able (at least) to treat names as 
descriptions. However, for my argument to go through, all we need is 
that names need not be descriptors, but can be rigid designators. 
7. This is most likely needed independently in expressions like 
John Smith, arguably of the form "John" ("Smith" (j». 
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because set membership was not at issue to begin with. 
In contrast, if only one sonnet is formal and 
meaningful, and the rest are not, we cannot give said 
properties to the prototypical sonnet, however it is 
that we come up with this notion (not set-theoretically 
if these ideas are correct).8 All of this is to say 
that there are ways in which one can compute (some) 
meaning without access to, in this instance, variables. 
Under the assumption that these correlate with 
functional structure, we have in effect provided a 
mechanism to compute some expressions without 
functional structure. It doesn't take much thought to 
see, however, that the kinds of things we are going to 
be able to compute this way is rather limited. In 
essence, we will be able to name identified entities, 
and stack further names onto these named entities. 
Note the presupposition for this view is that 
prototypical "ur" concepts can be grasped rather 
freely, and can be added amongst them and applied to 
individuated entities by way of the naming labeling. 9 
It is not trivial how exactly these additions, 
particularly of predicates (e.g. "formal and 
meaningful"), are going to proceed, especially after we 
8. Another typical instance where a kind reading ensues, and in 
fact no other reading as far as I can see, is what traditionally 
have been called 'impersonal constructions': 
(i) a. Man spricht hier Deutsch 
b. Ici on parle Francais 
c. Aqui se habla Espanol 
It is rather unfortunate that these expressions are called 
impersonal, for they must necessarily invoke a human subject. At 
any rate, in each case the human kind here (wherever that might be) 
is said to speak such-and-such a language. This is true even if 
some individuals do not. (It is possible that the ~ and Qll (from 
the Latin homo 'man') markers that we see in these examples mean 
literally that, 'man'--in line with their etymology. In that case, 
we could represent the reading in question as "man"(i) , with the 
usual sexist overtones ... ) Crucially, a partition reading is 
impossible in instances like (ii): 
(ii) a. Man spricht hier Deutsch und Swahili 
b. Ici on parle Francais et Swahili 
c. Aqui se habla Espanol y Swahili 
Suppose that "here" is some country. What these sentences mean is 
that (prototypical) humans in this country speak both languages at 
issue, not that they divide in those who speak one or the other. 
9. Semantics of the sort exploring cognitive primitives (such as 
"human" and "cause") could in principle provide an answer to this 
matter. 
9
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have devoided ourselves from set-theory, and hence 
functions. But one can imagine ways around this; for 
instance, that fuzzy concepts can be created for kinds 
which contain some properties of each of the added 
predicates, not necessarily all. 10 
In sum, the conceptual consequences of this move 
are vast. Some of these are maybe correct, and have 
been discussed. To invoke a deliberately provocative 
example--which as far as I know has not been mentioned 
in the relevant literature--recall experiments on 
dolphin communication. The ones I am vaguely familiar 
with had these animals being able to understand the 
equivalent of "red ball" or "small ball", but by no 
means the equivalent of "no ball" or "three balls". 
One can conjecture that although these mammals have 
somehow access to (some sort) of meaning computation of 
the sort outlined, they surely do not have access to 
set-theoretic computations. 11 To pursue the 
speculation, one wonders whether the genetic mutation 
that gave humans language is related to the quantum 
10. Needless to say, the consequences of this go way beyond the 
scope of this note. Personally, I am of the belief that the way 
humans conceptualize, say, "water" has nothing to do with a 
(realistic) definition of this concept, but rather with (fuzzy) 
bundles of properties that concern humans. That, of course, is hard 
to establish--nevertheless is intuitively rather clear. For me to 
call something "water", I am going to worry about whether it is 
something tangible, it tastes/smells/looks in such-and-such a way, 
and so on, rather than about whether it has this or the other atomic 
structure, or whatever other analytic approach of the sort that 
worries philosophers. 
11. Apparently, dolphins could also understand "every ball". It 
is not clear to me, though, that this is necessarily a 
quantificational reading. It could well be that the animal 
understands, say, "bring ball", and keeps bringing these objects 
until there's nothing else to bring. I don't know whether the 
experiments were careful enough to test this. One can imagine, 
also, that these animals could get some form of "some ball", by 
interpreting "bring ball" as a command to bring something which is 
a ball. However, the minute one goes to generalized quantifiers, 
such as "many balls", or "most balls", or any numerals, problems 
would immediately arise if no set theory is available. I would like 
to know, finally, whether dolphins and so on can compute expressions 
like "red small ball", and if so whether they interpret them as "red 
and small ball" or as "red [small ball)"; the latter can be tested 
by making them interpret "large small ball", which would be 
contradictory if one does not have access to a recursive operation. 
10
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leap that entails having access to recursion, with the 
possible consequence, at least, of getting set Theory 
as a result. 
Speculations aside, I went through the trouble 
of suggesting a way to compute sheer predicates (by 
"sheer" I mean predicates that stand out there as 
concepts, not as functions defining sets) to point in 
the direction of what I would like to see theories do 
that claim that functional elements are not available 
to infants: can we then be shown how it is that these 
infants compute meaning? If my suggestions are on the 
right track, do children, for instance, start by naming 
entities, and then associate them to predicates, before 
they go into more elaborate constructions?12 And so 
on. My very vague knowledge of these matters tells me 
that perhaps children do follow a sequence along these 
lines, but I won't venture to speculate anything in 
this respect. At any rate, it should be obvious that, 
under any hypothesis about functional categories that 
relates these bijectively to set-theoretic operations, 
if the former are missing, the latter should be too. 
And it seems to me that this is worth exploring, if 
only to falsify either the psycholinguistic or the 
syntactic hypothesis or possibly both. 
I should say, though, that any radical version 
of the syntactic hypothesis just mentioned is bound to 
create all sorts of psycholinguistic nightmares. Take 
a difficult case. A verb like "frighten" is arguably 
represented in L(exical)-C(onceptual) structure as: 
CAUSE (x, (BE FEARED (x by y»). Not only are abstract 
morphemes and variables needed here, but furthermore 
the language learner must find out that two variables 
in the LC structure of this predicate are identical 
(the cause and the theme refer to the same individual). 
What does a child without Set Theory learn when faced 
with "frighten"? Does s/he only get a non-causative 
reading (available in instances like "unicorns frighten 
Bill")? Again, all of this is testable; for instance, 
a child without a causative reading for "frighten" 
should not be able to interpret "Bill was frightened by 
Mary" or "Mary frightened Bill to steal his lunch". In 
any case, if things are the way I presented them, then 
we would be really talking about maturation in a 
rightful sense. Thus the process should appear in all 
children roughly around the same age, variation being 
12. Or: Can they interpret "large small ball"? (See fn. 11.) 
11
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possible only within individuals, and not within 
language groups. (As I said in fn.2, this seems 
unlikely--more importantly, though, it is a falsifiable 
claim in rather non-trivial ways.) 
A milder version of the lexical/functional 
split, hypothesis (b) above, moves us directly into the 
issue of Parameter Theory. It is plainly obvious that 
different languages have different lexical space for 
these distinctions. Where a language like Haitian uses 
two verbs to express the event of an exchange of an 
object x from a given (not necessarily specified) 
location to a location~y caused by an individual z, 
English uses the ditransitive "give". Therefore the 
set of lexical categories of English in this view is 
smaller for this subpart of the language than in 
Haitian. The question is then: are Haitian children 
slower in picking up the relevant distinctions than 
English children are? If they are, then this could be 
interesting evidence for the hypothesis in question; I 
suspect, though, that matters are a bit more complex, 
to which I now turn. 
The real issue is whether the set of 
hypothesized functional categories (in terms of (a) or 
(b) above or any other reasonable hypothesis) coincides 
with the set of elements that children allegedly do not 
have in a given language. Suppose it doesn't. 
However, suppose that the last of these sets in fact is 
syntactically definable in a plausible way. In other 
words, is a sub-set of the set of functional 
categories, such that "so-and-so", where the latter is 
some kind of syntactic property. It is conceivable 
that "so-and-so" is hard to learn; in fact, typical if 
we are dealing with a Subset Principle instance. It 
could be thus argued that if "so-and-so" corresponds to 
the marked option, it takes longer to learn it if the 
necessary input data is exotic or hard to process. As 
has often been argued, the former should be irrelevant, 
short of allowing the possibility of coming up with 
potentially different adult grammars--but the latter, 
as has been noted, is possible. (Note also that if the 
issue were one of exotic data, maturation would have 
nothing to do with the matter.) In this instance, we 
may expect variation not just within individuals, but 
also within language groups, obviously. 
There is one kind of parameter, however, which 
cannot have anything to do with developmental matters: 
what we may call 'underspecification' parameters. 
12
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These have really no status within UG, but are merely 
'shortcuts' that this system takes. Head position is 
an example that has been mentioned in this respect. It 
is entirely plausible that UG simply has nothing to say 
about linearity of heads/complements, and these get 
linearized one way or another because of the nature of 
PF. 13 Since this type of parameter is not part of UG, 
we cannot make reference to it. One cannot grow into 
its specifications simply because there is no state to 
achieve. At best, some additional process might 
obscure access to the arbitrary setting that these 
parameters take. This, however, seems highly unlikely 
for this kind of parameter. If this were true, there 
would be a stage where children, say, have both options 
for head position open (there is no unmarked option 
that UG provides). In fact, such stages do not seem to 
be attested. 
There are probably good reasons for that. I am 
assuming here that linguistic structures are, to use a 
term with a precise meaning in Physics, 'chiral'. That 
is, just like SUb-atomic particles move in one 
arbitrary direction, so too heads and dependents must 
be fixed in an arbitrary direction--it doesn't matter 
which, so long as this 'handedness' is kept throughout 
the system. As a matter of fact, I will assume that 
'chirality' is a property of any system that entails 
(even very abstract) communication, hence not part of 
the linguistic system. 14 But if setting this 
parameter is so central to the "chirality" of the 
system, it simply is unlikely that the necessary 
information to set it is hard to process. At any rate, 
the situation contrasts drastically with Sub-set 
parameters, where not just the parameter, but even the 
unmarked option comes specified within UG by the Theory 
of Markedness. 
13. There are fairly elaborate studies on the setting of 
parameters of the Sub-set type, showing evidence that children start 
with the unmarked option, as expected. No evidence, as far as I 
know, has ever been presented that 'head-last' or 'head-first' is 
the unmarked option. It seems very likely, thus, that neither is, 
which is what is predicted if this is a sort of epiphenomeno1ogica1 
parameter. 
14. If different sub-atomic particles didn't agree on whether to 
move right or left, fields simply couldn't exist; likewise, if two 
observers in outer space do not agree on what right and left or up 
and down are, they couldn't communicate anything about the universe 
they observe. 
13
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In real life, parameters can be extremely 
intricate, and can deceive one into thinking that a 
maturational issue is at stake. Consider a kind of 
parameter that does not get much attention lately, but 
was discussed a few years ago: a 'domain specific' 
parameter--as opposed to a 'global' one that cuts 
across the whole language. 15 Take for instance 
clitics/agreement-markers in different languages. 
There is a vast range of variation here in terms of 
whether a given argument is doubled, and if so whether 
it is doubled by agreement (intuitively, a clitic 
encoded into the morphology) or by a clitic. Well 
known implications emerge. For instance, no language 
with object doubling lacks subject doubling; however, 
the converse isn't true: there are languages with 
subject doubling that lack object doubling. 
Furthermore, if the doubling in question is of the 
agreement type for the object, then so it must be for 
the subject; again, the converse not being true. 
Differences are even more subtle than this, with 
implications also holding internal to objects, whether 
they are direct or indirect, and even internal to 
arguments, whether they are pronominal or full. 
Suppose that we are talking here about a number n of 
variations; for binary parameters, this means we should 
get 2 to the nth square variations. In fact we get 
much less than that. As is well known, also, we cannot 
reduce this number by linking parameters logically, 
under the well motivated assumption that these are all 
independent. 
However, suppose that parameters with the 
following format are possible: property P does/not hold 
(in domain d), for d a variable ranging over relevant 
syntactic domains. And now imagine that two given 
values of d are logically linked as a matter of UG. 
Take the concrete case I have mentioned. Let it be the 
case that internal arguments do not enter into 
agreement relations, but externalized arguments may. 
Imagine then a language that forces LC THEME arguments 
to be externalized in the syntax (say, Basque). This 
means that for any argument higher in the Thematic 
Hierarchy within this language, said argument must be 
externalized. LC restrictions, together with the 
parametric option of externalizing a 'low' argument, 
have as a logical consequence the externalization of a 
15. This type of parameter can arguably be either of the Subset 
or the Underspecification type. 
14
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'higher' argument. The converse, of course, isn't 
true. Thus, for instance, for a language that forces LC 
BENEFICIARY arguments to be externalized in the syntax 
(e.g., Galician), it does not follow that THEME 
arguments must be externalized. In effect, there is an 
implication that UG introduces once we affect the 
structures it generates by a parametric decision. 
Crucial for this is that the parameter in question not 
be a global one of the sort: "Do/not externalize all 
arguments." Such a parameter would be immune to 
implications within the argument system in terms of 
internal/external specifications. Within this view 
nothing about the parameter system is implicational. 
Typically, language variation and language 
change happens within this sort of parameter. There 
are well-known 'cycles' in this. At a given 
diachronical stage, language L does not have any marks 
of externalization for its arguments in terms of 
agreement (like Black English). Dislocation strategies 
allow displaced arguments to bind pronouns: "John, Mary 
thinks he left". Some of these get to be systematic 
even in short distance cases: "John, he left". Some of 
the pronouns in these constructions cliticize onto the 
verb, becoming obligatory (this is typical in many 
English creoles). At a given point, clitics may get 
integrated into the morphology of the verb, and an 
inflectional variant arises--sometimes as a consequence 
of verb movement, which places the pronoun in a suffix 
position. Fully inflected verbs, though, are subject 
to morpho/phonological changes (like the stress 
retraction suffered by Middle English); this may result 
in the loss of agreement morphemes. And we are back 
were we started. These cycles, in turn, are restricted 
by properties of UG, as seen above. Thus, the 
prediction is that if a language accepts a verb-object 
relation "like-her Mary" it is because it has already 
accepted a verb-subject relation "John he-like ••• ". 
NOW, consider a language where the adult grammar 
says "thou criest" and "thou seest-her Mary", but not 
*"thou cry" and *"thou see(st) Mary". Suppose that 
children learning this language at stage I have no 
access to either clitics or affixes, which is tested 
independently of these constructions by them not being 
able to say, for instance, "chickens" (they say 
*"chicken"), or "John's nice" (they say *"John nice"). 
Then at time 1', children start getting clitics (they 
begin to say "John's nice"), but suppose they do not 
still get affixes (they still say *"chicken" with the 
15
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meaning of "chickens"). At /' the following data would 
be surprising: they say "thou criest". In this 
hypothetical example, a fair question is: has there 
been development from *"cry" to "criest" between / and 
I'? At first sight it would seem so: children reach 
"criest" without an apparent change in the perceptual 
mechanism that would allow them to get "chickens" 
correctly. But another variable may be invoked: There 
is a linguistic implication such that if a language has 
a direct object clitic, then it must have a subject 
clitic. The minute the child realizes s/he has a 
direct object clitic, s/he is forced by UG into 
positing a subject clitic. The agreement marker is a 
version of this. In a sense, the child could afford 
not to 'worry' about affixes corresponding to subject 
position until s/he decided to worry about clitics 
corresponding to object position. 
In as much as these are typical domains of 
language variation and change, the child must also be 
able to chose 'wrong' parametric options of the adult 
Core Grammar and stick to them. Whether the parameters 
that allow this are of the Underspecification or the 
Subset type is a complex matter I do not want to go 
into here. The point is that real life parametric 
situations may be extremely deceiving for the issue of 
development, in as much as internal properties of the 
grammar may force spectacular changes that have nothing 
to do with development, at least in intermediate 
stages. These are precisely the interesting ones, in 
as much as they follow indirectly from triggering 
evidence in a different, grammatically related domain. 
These matters are more deceiving with Domain specific 
parameters than otherwise, for in these, properties are 
sequentially connected. That is, for a Global 
parameter, one expects a set of changes to happen at 
the same time, at the moment the parameter is set. 
These can be spectacular also, but they shoUld appear 
at the same point, and hence can be seen as a typical 
parametric situation. However, with Domain Specific 
parameters, first one sees less global changes (so an 
immediate parametric approach cannot be taken by the 
observer); and second one may see changes in sequence, 
which is of course tempting to interpret 
developmentally. 
In any case, I have suggested that development 
could be at stake only when the Theory of Markedness is 
involved. To recast the point: the child would be 
maturing in the sense that s/he is led into the 
16
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unmarked form because of not being able to perceive the 
triggering evidence setting the marked one. One 
prediction of this approach is that those domains in 
which a developmental issue arises should coincide with 
marked parametric settings. Properties at this level 
can be fairly abstract, and we may deceive ourselves 
into thinking that a language doesn't have them, simply 
because they are not obvious. A case in point is long 
distance Wh-movement. Children of English, French, and 
Spanish were shown in this conference to be taking a 
route for these questions which is clear in German and 
other languages, but not apparently in the former. It 
has been proposed, however, that in fact this strategy 
is indeed used also by adult grammars, although this is 
far from obvious and needs to be argued for. At any 
rate, even if arguments to this effect didn't exist, 
the fact that the option that children take is possible 
in a given language (not necessarily their own) is 
enough to begin to sketch an account so long as it is 
assumed that the property in question is unmarked. 
What should be clear is that if a child does 
something which no adult does systematically, then a 
parametric account cannot be at stake. This means that 
the only other option is for the account to be saying 
something about the system of principles, perhaps 
interacting with other properties--the latter being 
parametric. The matter of the universality of the 
phenomenon in question is then at stake, and the less 
variation in terms of when it occurs the better for 
this approach. Ideally, the variation should be none; 
if it isn't, it must be explained in terms of 
consequences of the parametric options taken by a given 
language. This would be the clearest instance of a 
maturational process. Research in this sense is always 
interesting, for it may suggest changes that we 
theoreticians need to make in our model of UG, or may 
confirm hypotheses which are not otherwise completely 
obvious--even if this entails that maturation is not 
necessarily happening, but the facts are simply clearer 
in child grammars. Thus, for instance, research that 
claims children do not invoke traces in event adjuncts 
strengthens the position in the literature that this is 
true in the adult grammar. Theoretical arguments, 
however, had scarce, non-theory-internal evidence. 16 
16. It should be obvious that this is precisely the type of 
account that cannot be parametric: we do not expect some languages 
to license adjunct variables in terms of traces, and some others to 
17
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The second thing that should be clear is that a 
child cannot do something that no adult does at all. 
One thing is to say that the system of principles is 
articulated enough to have two degrees of complexity, 
and one does not go from level-l to level-2 until a 
given state in the general development of the mind is 
reached (the change has to come externally to the 
language system). Another very different thing is to 
say that the language faculty is such that at the 
growing period it has (positive) properties that it 
loses at the adult period. There may indeed be 
properties that are of this sort; for instance, it is 
not inconceivable that the phonetic system of a 
babbling child is richer than that of an adult, fixed 
for a given language (there may be certain sounds that 
the adult 'cannot' do without retraining). But 
crucially, the adult set of properties is a sub-set of 
the children's set of properties (if you wish, open 
parametric options). This is completely different from 
one of the examples I gave some attention to: a 
language that contains both lexical and functional 
elements is obviously larger than one that contains 
only lexical ones--which is a sub-set of the adult 
language. Therefore, no hypothesized property of this 
sort can be such that it does not show up in some form 
in the adult grammar. 17 Furthermore, if the claim for 
lack of (certain) functional categories is to be 
explained in terms of the Theory of Markedness, it must 
be that the option of having these categories is 
marked. personally, I find this unlikely--though it is 
in line with claims about languages of the Asian type 
lacking these elements altogether. 
Any claims for 'missing links' between adults 
and children, no matter how plausible, have to address 
the issue of how to be incorporated into our general 
theories of language and learning. In general, 
puzzling psycholinguistic evidence necessarily tells us 
something either about UG or about the process of 
language acquisition (assuming, of course, it doesn't 
tell us anything about a faulty experiment). Here, I 
have outlined some of the possible questions that the 
adduced evidence may raise for UG. Assuming that the 
studies in point address the issues I raised, their 
license them in terms of, say, event variables. 
17. The readings of incorporated nouns may be an example of a 
"child-like" property of adult grammars, if my sketchy analysis was 
correct. 
18
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consequences are potentially very important. For 
instance, they would argue for the lexical/functional 
distinction: further for differences in complexity 
(semantic, phonological) between these: or for the 
existence of a kind of parameter 'which is not 
epiphenomenological (although they would not argue 
against such parameters) and further is described by 
the Sub-set Principle. 
An important question that has to be addressed, 
and according to my initial presuppositions cannot be 
dealt with in this light, is: how is 'unlearning' 
possible? This is particularly relevant, for the logic 
of the approach forces us to take answers that in fact 
explain away these issues. Thus, for instance, it has 
been noted in this conference that children who do not 
know that the locative argument of "put" is 
subcategorized treat it like an adjunct in a wide 
variety of contexts. This, presumably, is not done by 
any adult grammar. Is the child then violating the 
fundamental Axiom of no properties which adults lack? 
In this particular example, I think not. The 
child is making an assumption that is coherent with 
adult grammars: given sub-categorizations, though a 
function of semantic selection, are nevertheless 
specific to predicates within that range. Thus, there 
does not seem to be anything particularly principled 
about not having a verb *"to be in hate" alongside "to 
be in love", or to allow a causative alternation for 
"the horse jumped" vs. "John jumped the horse" but not 
for "the horse laughed" vs. *"John laughed the horse". 
These matters may have to do with knowledge of the 
world, and so on--but knowledge of the world has to be 
learned, this time using "learn" in a strict sense. 
Therefore, it should not be surprising if--and has been 
noted that--children utter expressions like "John 
laughed the horse" to mean "John made the horse laugh", 
and furthermore if this sentence in the child grammar 
had 'correct' adult grammar properties to it. (Indeed, 
the opposite case would be surprising for the latter.) 
If the use of "laugh" in question gets to be dropped 
when the child becomes a small adult, no 'unlearning' 
of the type that troubles most of us here took place. 
Simply, a possible region of the lexical map is not 
encoded, and is erased from long-term memory. 
In that sense, the whole process has to do with 
those properties of language that I started setting 
aside, arguing that linguistics has little to say about 
19
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them. What I do not know is whether all instances of 
apparent unlearning can be explained away. Otherwise, 
they would be real counterexamples to the approach I 
sketched here, and may in fact be used to argue for a 
developmental system that has UG itself (not just 
outside cognitive systems) follow a given path--of the 
sort I did not know how to explore. This path would 
include going from impossible adult properties to 
attested ones; I am very skeptical, but I see no reason 
in principle why humans shouldn't lose properties when 
growing. In any case, this would be the strongest kind 
of argument for the view in question; the alternative 
one (where the matter is one of gaining properties as 
we grow up), can always be expressed in terms of 
instantaneous learning hypotheses plus cognitive 
developments which are obvious anyway. 
To summarize, I have used a now traditional set 
of assumptions about human grammars to constrain the 
possible developmental properties of these. If these 
assumptions are correct, maturation is only possible 
within the system of principles as a whole, or within 
Subset-type parameters. In both instances, I have 
assumed that the development in question is extra-
linguistic: something in the cognitive capacity of 
children a time t either disallows them to have access 
to a sub-set of principles, or to marked parametric 
options. In fact, the latter instance is arguably 
connected to perceptual development of the sort needed 
to process complex data. As for the former, it could 
either be a perceptual or an internal computational 
limitation. The tacit assumption in both instances is 
that if the Language Acquisition Device were 'fixed' 
with respect to the 'problems' in question, it would 
acquire the relevant aspect of language immediately. 
In a nutshell, I haven't really said anything new--but 
then again I'm not sure there's anything new to say. 
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